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Data sourced from CMS Medicare Part D Public Use Files (2023). This site provides statistical analysis for transparency — not medical advice or accusations.

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Pharmacy Benefit Managers: The Middlemen Driving Drug Costs

Analysis · March 2026

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Between the doctor who writes a prescription and the patient who picks it up, there's an industry most people have never heard of that controls what you pay, what drugs are available, and how much your pharmacist gets reimbursed. Pharmacy Benefit Managers — PBMs — process over 80% of all prescriptions in the United States. Three companies (Express Scripts, CVS Caremark, and OptumRx) control roughly 80% of the market. And their business model creates perverse incentives that may be driving up the cost of the $275.65B in Medicare Part D drug spending we analyze.

3

PBMs Control 80% of Rx

$275.65B

Medicare Part D Spending

$100B+

Est. PBM Revenue

13.4%

Brand Rx Rate

What PBMs Actually Do

PBMs were originally created to simplify prescription drug claims processing. In theory, they negotiate lower drug prices on behalf of health plans and employers. In practice, their business model has evolved into something far more complex — and far more profitable for the PBMs themselves.

The Big Three

CVS Caremark

Owned by CVS Health, which also owns Aetna (insurance) and CVS Pharmacy (retail). This vertical integration means one company controls the insurance, the PBM, and the pharmacy — creating obvious conflicts of interest. Market share: ~33%.

Express Scripts (Cigna)

Owned by Cigna Group. Processes over 1.4 billion prescriptions annually. Like CVS, the insurance-PBM integration creates a closed loop where the entity negotiating drug prices also profits from higher overall healthcare spending. Market share: ~24%.

OptumRx (UnitedHealth)

Owned by UnitedHealth Group, the largest health insurer in the US. OptumRx is part of the Optum subsidiary that also runs medical clinics and data analytics — another vertical monopoly spanning insurance, pharmacy benefits, and care delivery. Market share: ~23%.

How PBMs Profit: The Mechanisms

1. Spread Pricing

Spread pricing is arguably the most controversial PBM practice. Here's how it works: a PBM charges the health plan (in Medicare's case, the Part D plan sponsor) one price for a drug, then reimburses the pharmacy a lower price, and keeps the difference — the "spread."

Example: How Spread Pricing Works

PBM charges Part D plan:$150 per prescription
PBM reimburses pharmacy:$95 per prescription
PBM keeps (the "spread"):$55 per prescription

This example is illustrative. Actual spreads vary widely by drug, ranging from a few dollars for generics to hundreds of dollars for specialty medications.

The Ohio Medicaid program audited its PBMs in 2018 and found spread pricing cost taxpayers $224 million in one year. For generic drugs — which should be cheap — PBMs charged Medicaid an average of 31% more than they paid pharmacies. The practice has since been banned in Ohio Medicaid but remains legal in most Medicare Part D contracts.

2. Rebate Clawbacks

Drug manufacturers pay PBMs rebates for favorable formulary placement — essentially paying to have their drug on the "preferred" list. These rebates can be 30-70% of the drug's list price. Here's the catch: PBMs often don't pass the full rebate through to the plan (and thus to Medicare/patients).

A 2024 FTC report found that the Big Three PBMs retained an average of 23% of all manufacturer rebates. On a $275.65B Medicare Part D program, even a few percentage points of retained rebates translates to billions of dollars.

3. Formulary Manipulation

PBMs decide which drugs are on their formulary and at what "tier" (which determines patient copays). This creates a powerful incentive structure: a PBM might prefer a $500/month brand drug that offers a 60% rebate over a $50/month generic that offers no rebate — because the PBM makes more money on the expensive drug even though it costs Medicare more.

4. Pharmacy DIR (Direct and Indirect Remuneration) Fees

DIR fees are retroactive charges that PBMs impose on pharmacies after prescriptions are filled. A pharmacy might fill a prescription and receive $100, only to have $15-25 clawed back months later as a DIR fee. These fees make it nearly impossible for independent pharmacies to predict their revenue — and many have closed as a result.

The PBM Impact on Medicare Part D Drugs

The drugs that generate the most PBM profit are typically expensive brand-name medications with high rebates. Here are the top 20 drugs in Medicare Part D by total cost — each one passes through the PBM system:

#Drug (Brand)Total CostClaimsCost/Claim
1Eliquis$7.75B8,995,930$862
2Ozempic$4.30B3,193,643$1,347
3Jardiance$3.58B3,334,784$1,074
4Trulicity$2.99B2,175,100$1,373
5Xarelto$2.45B2,628,123$934
6Humira(Cf) Pen$2.17B240,925$8,997
7Revlimid$2.15B130,834$16K
8Lantus Solostar$1.94B3,118,259$622
9Trelegy Ellipta$1.81B2,046,216$885
10Farxiga$1.65B1,666,200$989
11Januvia$1.54B1,567,668$983
12Entresto$1.30B1,220,812$1,066
13Biktarvy$1.29B310,738$4,154
14Enbrel Sureclick$1.12B145,737$7,682
15Xtandi$985.0M72,710$14K
16Myrbetriq$927.5M1,407,073$659
17Mounjaro$877.9M680,457$1,290
18Imbruvica$875.8M56,368$16K
19Stelara$852.3M31,974$27K
20Invega Sustenna$832.3M252,388$3,298

These top 20 drugs account for $41.40B — roughly 15% of all Medicare Part D spending. Each transaction passes through a PBM that extracts value at every step.

The Perverse Incentive Problem

The fundamental issue with PBMs is structural: PBMs make more money when drugs cost more. Their profit comes from percentages — rebates calculated as a percentage of list price, spread pricing margins that increase with higher prices, and administrative fees pegged to drug costs. A PBM that successfully lowered overall drug prices would be reducing its own revenue.

The Insulin Example

Insulin costs roughly $2-$5 to manufacture. Yet list prices reached $300+ per vial — and PBMs played a central role. Insulin manufacturers raised list prices knowing that PBMs demanded larger rebates. PBMs preferred higher list prices because they received larger rebates (even if they passed some through). The patient — especially those in the Medicare Part D coverage gap — paid based on the inflated list price. The Inflation Reduction Act's $35/month insulin cap finally broke this cycle for Medicare patients, but the broader dynamic persists for other drugs.

Impact on Independent Pharmacies

The PBM business model has been devastating for independent pharmacies. Over 10,000 independent pharmacies have closed since 2010, with PBM reimbursement practices cited as the leading cause. The pattern is clear:

  • PBMs reimburse independent pharmacies at lower rates than their own affiliated pharmacies
  • Retroactive DIR fees make revenue unpredictable and often negative on individual prescriptions
  • Preferred pharmacy networks steer patients to PBM-owned or PBM-affiliated pharmacies
  • Audit clawbacks — where PBMs audit pharmacy records and demand refunds — create an adversarial dynamic

This matters for Medicare patients because independent pharmacies disproportionately serve rural communities and underserved urban neighborhoods. When these pharmacies close, patients lose access — creating prescription deserts that compound existing health disparities.

What's Being Done About It

The FTC Investigation (2024-2025)

The Federal Trade Commission launched a comprehensive investigation into PBM practices in 2022, culminating in a 2024 report that confirmed many long-suspected abuses. Key findings included:

  • PBMs steered patients toward PBM-owned pharmacies, even when cheaper alternatives existed
  • Rebate structures favored higher-cost drugs over clinically equivalent cheaper alternatives
  • Pharmacy reimbursement rates were often below the pharmacy's acquisition cost
  • The three largest PBMs had collective market power that stifled competition

Congressional Action

Multiple bills have been introduced targeting PBM practices:

  • Pharmacy Benefit Manager Transparency Act — Would require PBMs to disclose rebate amounts, spread pricing margins, and administrative fees
  • PBM Reform Act — Would ban spread pricing in Medicare and require 100% rebate passthrough
  • Delinking Act — Would decouple PBM compensation from drug prices, requiring flat-fee contracts

CMS Rule Changes

CMS has made incremental changes to Medicare Part D that affect PBMs:

  • DIR fee reform (effective 2024) requires price concessions to be reflected at the point of sale
  • IRA provisions cap insulin at $35/month and begin Medicare drug price negotiations
  • New transparency requirements for Part D plan sponsors regarding PBM contracts

How This Connects to Our Data

When you see a drug in our database costing $171 per claim on average, that figure reflects the price after PBM processing. The actual amounts flowing between manufacturers, PBMs, pharmacies, and plans are far more complex:

The Drug Pricing Waterfall

$500Manufacturer list price (WAC)
↓ Rebate to PBM (30%)
$350Net price after rebate
↓ PBM retains portion (~23%)
$385Price charged to Part D plan
↓ Spread pricing margin
$310Pharmacy reimbursement
↓ DIR fee clawback
$285What the pharmacy actually keeps

The Brand vs. Generic Decision

PBM incentives directly affect the brand-vs-generic prescribing patterns we see in our data. Currently,13.4% of Medicare Part D claims are for brand-name drugs. But brand drugs account for$185.46B of the $275.65B total — a disproportionate share driven partly by PBM formulary decisions that favor rebated brands over cheaper generics.

When a generic drug becomes available, the PBM should switch patients to save money. But if the brand manufacturer offers a large enough rebate, the PBM may keep the brand on the preferred tier. The patient pays more (higher brand copay), Medicare pays more (higher plan liability), but the PBM profits from the rebate.

What Would Real Reform Look Like?

  1. Ban spread pricing in Medicare — PBMs should be paid flat administrative fees, not percentage-based margins
  2. 100% rebate passthrough — All manufacturer rebates should flow to plans and patients, not PBMs
  3. Delink PBM compensation from drug prices — Remove the incentive to prefer expensive drugs
  4. Prohibit vertical integration — or at minimum require structural separation between PBM, pharmacy, and insurance functions
  5. Real-time pricing transparency — Patients and prescribers should see the actual net cost of drugs at the point of prescribing

📚 Data Sources & Methodology

Drug cost data is from CMS Medicare Part D Prescriber Public Use File (2023). PBM market share estimates are from Drug Channels Institute. FTC findings are from the 2024 Interim Report on PBMs. Spread pricing data is from the Ohio Medicaid audit (2018) and subsequent state investigations.

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